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1 Introduction 
 
The inspiration for this paper stems from the unprecedented media coverage 
surrounding the legal process in relation to Oscar Pistorius. Overnight South Africa‟s 
criminal justice system became a world-spectacle, highlighting the realities of an era 
engulfed by modern communication and its plethora of mediums. Evidence was 
made public, live-feed flowed from the court, the news was saturated, the public was 
encapsulated, and the presiding officer issued warnings to the media. Despite this, 
the assertion that the media has no impact on presiding officers is strongly asserted. 
Deliberately ignoring the potential influence and failing to scrutinise the relationship 
between the media and the legal process, means we will never understand the 
impact the media may have on the criminal trial and on our presiding officers.   
The above prompted a reconsideration of the ruling in Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a 
E-TV v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) (“Midi”).2 This paper is only 
concerned with the judicial evaluation of one right in relation to contempt law in 
South Africa.3 The rule under consideration is the sub judice rule,4 and the right at 
issue is freedom of expression.5 Whenever “pre-eminence” is used in this paper, it is 
in the above context that the word is used. This paper does not advocate a blanket 
                                                        
1
 The title of this paper is borrowed and adapted from D Milo & P Stein “The Quiet Revolution for 
Freedom of the Press” (28-05-2007) Legal Brief <http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php?story= 
20070528163021109> (accessed 10-06-2013).  
2
 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a E-TV v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 2007 2 SACR 
493 (SCA). 
3
 Judicial as opposed to Executive or Legislative views on the matter, which may at times be 
contrasted to the former, see: Film and Publication Amendment Bill B27-2006 in GG 29169 of 31-8-
2006; the Protection of Information Bill B28-2008 in GG 30885 of 18-3-2008; Protection of Personal 
Information Bill B9-2009 in GG 32495 of 14-9-2009.  
4
 A specific rule within the broader contempt law, concerning contempt‟s ex facie curiae with reference 
to pending judicial proceedings and potentially prejudicial publications.  
5
 S 16(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”), states that: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes: (a) freedom of the press and other 
media; (b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and (d) 
academic freedom and freedom of scientific research”. S 16 is a qualified right and contains an 
internal modifier in s 16(2): “The right in subsection (1) does not extend to (a) propaganda for war; (b) 
incitement of imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or 
religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm”.  
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ban on freedom of expression, nor does it argue that restrictions are pre-requisites 
for justice. A more nuanced and pragmatic understanding of the issue is needed, 
instead of the standard view of the need for unhindered free speech and censorship 
law being malevolent. 
Democratic governments are built on the fundamental premise and assumption 
that more, rather than less, information is necessary to achieve democratic values 
and goals. This paper aims to highlight a trend, or “quiet revolution,” within contempt 
law toward judicial favouritism of freedom of expression at the expense of other 
equally important rights.6 Despite the assertion that all rights are equal and no right 
is absolute,7 freedom of expression is becoming a pre-eminent right. This revolution 
or favouritism can be attributed to historical reasons, judicial behaviour, the legal 
methodology used by our courts and a complete disregard to scrutinise the media‟s 
potential impact on the judiciary. 
Not long before Midi was decided, the weight of opinion stated that the public 
interest in a fair and impartial trial must prevail over the public interest to comment 
on matters of topical importance, concluding that the sub judice rule is not 
unconstitutional even as it stood in its most unrefined form.8 A critical analysis of Midi 
will illustrate how the sub judice rule has been obliterated9 as a result of the above 
tendencies and contributing factors. 
Therefore this paper argues, in the field of contempt law, freedom of expression is 
becoming a pre-eminent right trumping others without adequate and reflective 
justification. This has been made possible through a historical interpretation or 
conception of the right and a cumulative effect of inadequate balancing as a method 
to deal with conflicts involving freedom of expression. This is best seen in Midi. As a 
result, a rule aimed at protecting another equally valuable right has been trumped by 
the pre-eminence of freedom of expression, a rule prior to Midi, Oscar Pistorius may 
have relied on. To begin assessing the validity of these propositions, a nuanced 
understanding of the right to freedom of expression is needed. 
 
                                                        
6
 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) 737-797.  
7
 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a E-TV v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 2007 2 SACR 
493 (SCA) para 9,  11: rights cannot be reconciled by purporting to weigh the value of one right 
against the value of the other and then preferring the right that is considered to be more valued, and 
jettisoning the other, because all protected rights have equal value.  
8
 J Burchell & J Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3 ed (2005) 946 951. 
9
 P De Vos “Don‟t Hide Behind (Non-Existent) Sub Judice Rule” (18-07-2011) Constitutionally 
Speaking <http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/dont-hide-behind-non-existent-sub-judice-rule/> 
(accessed 2-06-2013) where he states that the „SCA in effect gutted the sub judice rule”, it is “non-
existent” and “effectively abolished”. 
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2 Freedom of expression and its pre-eminence  
 
Why is freedom of expression so important? It is often stated that freedom of 
expression plays an important role in the functioning of any democratic society,10 that 
it is one of humanity‟s most cherished freedoms11 and it is a hard won and precious 
asset.12 The Constitution “represents an emphatic break with a past characterized by 
denial of human dignity, and commits South Africa to a transition to a new society 
characterised by a commitment to recognising the value of human beings”,13 and in 
this context, the right to freedom of expression has been described as an integral 
part within this transition.14  
South Africa has emerged from a time where expression was subjected to severe 
restrictions,15 thus underlining the need, or want, to protect freedom of expression in 
our new democracy all the more.16 The importance of this right has been recognised 
in a number of decisions of our Constitutional Court (CC).17  
Considering the impact of apartheid in relation to how freedom of expression is 
conceived as a right, it is evident then that there is a tendency to equate totalitarian, 
autocratic, dictatorial regimes and draconian censorship laws with a lack of freedom 
of expression.18 It seems natural then that our judiciary would place emphasis on 
freedom of expression to perform this task: to encourage and solidify democracy.  As 
a result, the conception of freedom of expression as a right is instinctively over-
                                                        
10
 D Eady & ATH Smith Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt 2 ed (1999) 2-49. 
11
 D Milo, G Penfold & A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2008) 42-14, referring to Mandela v Falati 1995 1 SA 251, 259 
(W): “In a free society all freedoms are important, but they are not equally important. Political 
philosophers are agreed about the primacy of the freedom of speech. It is the freedom upon which all 
the other freedoms depend; it is the freedom without which the others would not long endure”. 
12
 B Van Niekerk The Cloistered Virtue: Freedom of Speech and the Administration of Justice in the 
Western World (1987) 149.  
13
 S Hoctor “The Right to Freedom of Expression and the Criminal Law - The Journey Thus Far” 
(2005) 3 Obiter 461. 
14
 461.  
15
 Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority and Others 2002 4 SA 294 (CC) 
para 25: “The restrictions that were placed on expression were not only a denial of democracy itself, 
but also exacerbated the impact of the systemic violations of other fundamental human rights in South 
Africa”. 
16
 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 1999 6 BCLR 615 (CC) para 7: “It is 
valuable for many reasons, including its instrumental function as a guarantor of democracy”. 
17
 Aside from the above, see: Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC); Laugh It Off 
Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a SabMark International (Freedom of Expression 
Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 1 SA 144 (CC); Philips v Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Witwatersrand Local Division) 2004 1 SA 345 (CC). 
18
 Van Niekerk The Cloistered Virtue 7. 
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valued.19 Granting freedom of expression special protection prevents interference 
with it in ways that would otherwise be considered reasonable.20 This tendency is 
evident in the way the South African judiciary conceives of this right and their 
approach in dealing with it as a right. 
Freedom of expression then is evidently a jealously protected right.21 In 
supporting these claims, freedom of expression‟s pre-eminence has been justified in 
a number of other ways.22 The search for truth, the functioning of a democracy, self-
fulfillment, autonomy and liberty,23 the furtherance of tolerance are some of the 
justifications or rationales given in support of its pre-eminence.24 These justifications 
can be seen in the CC case of the South African National Defence Union v Minister 
of Defence & Another 1999 (4) SA 469 (CC).25  
However the right to freedom of speech is justified, the essential point remains, 
that we grant  
 
“special protection to communicative activity which we do not grant to other activities, 
accepting the inevitable attendant harm to the public, because we believe that giving 
freedom of speech priority over the public interest serves certain fundamental values or 
goals”.26  
 
Despite the numerous justifications, it is not a given that the freedom of 
expression furthers these justifications.27 Why then is expression given greater 
protection from interference than other forms of conduct?28 Certain academics were 
unequivocally of the view, shortly before Midi was decided, that the sub judice rule, is 
not unconstitutional, and the limitation pursuant to it was justifiable: “the public 
interest in a fair and impartial trial must prevail over the public interest in comment on 
                                                        
19
 7.  
20
 D Meyerson “Does the Constitutional Court of South Africa Take Rights Seriously - The Case of the 
S v Jordan” (2004) 138 Acta Juridica 141. 
21
 Hoctor (2005) 3 Obiter 473: “thus it follows that the right to freedom of expression should be all the 
more zealously guarded by all who cherish freedom”. 
22
 Currie & De Waal (2005) 360-361: these purposes can be reduced to two justificatory grounds for 
the constitutional protection of freedom of expression: (i) the instrumental argument that the quality of 
government is improved when criticism is free and unfettered; and (ii) the constitutive argument that 
sees free speech as valuable because expression is an important part of what it means to be human.  
23
 Hoctor (2005) 3 Obiter 462.  
24
 Meyerson (2004) Acta Juridica 138 140. 
25
 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence & Another 1999 4 SA 469 (CC) para 7; 
as well as Phillips & Another v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division & Others 
2003 3 SA 345 (CC) para 23. 
26
 Meyerson (2004) Acta Juridica 138 140. 
27
 Milo, Penfold & Stein “Freedom of Expression” in CLOSA 42-14. 
28
 42-14.  
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matters of topical importance”.29 The answer to the question posed in this section 
therefore lies in a combination of historical scepticism in relation to under-protecting 
the right, and a devotion to it as a reason for over-protecting the right in light of its 
various justifications. 
Having considered the “why” question, it is now possible to move to the next 
question: “how”. The next section deals with the fact that many constitutions protect 
freedom of expression, as well as the right to a fair trial and the administration of 
justice. This therefore warrants an enquiry into “how” these rights are to be dealt with 
when in conflict.30  
 
In Nugent J‟s application to the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) for a position 
on the Constitutional Court, his judgement in Midi is described as:  
 
“a vital contribution to the balance between the right of freedom of speech and the right to 
a fair trial. It is an important judgment in demonstrating that no right is absolute and that 
all rights must be balanced against competing rights”.31 
 
Is this accurate? A better understanding of the balancing process is needed in 
order to test the accuracy of the above statement and provide an answer as to “how” 
freedom of expression has gained its pre-eminence.  
 
3 Balancing and judicial favouritism as contributing factors to freedom of 
expression’s pre-eminence  
 
Is it better to be candid about the process and rank rights against each other?32 Is 
it even possible to treat conflicting constitutional rights equally, or is a hierarchy of 
rights, formal or informal, an inevitable result?33  Does the balancing of rights by way 
                                                        
29
 Hoctor (2005) 3 Obiter 467. 
30
 Eady & Smith Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt 49. 
31
 Nugent JA “Judge Robert Nugent: The Joburg Bar Council‟s Assessment” (13-06-2012) Politics 
Web <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=305581&sn= 
Detail&pid=71619> (accessed 15-08-2013). 
32
 F Du Bois “Rights Trumped - Balancing in Constitutional Adjudication” (2004) 155 Acta Juridica 
180. 
33
 TL Banks “Balancing Competing Individual Constitutional Rights: Raising Some Questions” in PE 
Andrews & S Bazilli (eds) Law and Rights: Global Perspectives on Constitutionalism and Governance 
(2008) 28: “the German Constitutional Court in reconciling conflicting constitutional rights refers to the 
structural unity of its constitution applying the principle of practical concordance by which conflicting 
constitutional rights are harmonised and balanced so that each is preserved in creative tension with 
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of a proportionality test take the character of constitutional rights, as rights, 
seriously?34 Is the unswerving commitment of our courts to balancing appropriate? 
Are our courts giving the correct weighting? Are we over-protecting freedom of 
expression at the expense of other rights? These are many questions linked to the 
same problem, the answers to which contribute to illuminating the pre-eminence of 
the right to freedom of expression.  There are ways of testing the approach taken by 
a court in a specific instance of balancing but before testing if the method is worth its 
salt one must assess whether it is the desirable method to begin with. This section 
aims to show that balancing as a judicial tool to resolve conflicts of this nature may 
not be the best approach as it has the potential to give undue weight to certain rights 
and at the same time contribute to over-valuing certain rights. This is particularly 
worrying considering the expanded nature of the judiciary in our transitional 
democratic and constitutional state which increasingly falls back on such a method. 
The below will emphasise the contributing nature that a balancing enquiry has on the 
undervaluation of rights.35 
The dynamic nature of constitutional democracy makes the management of 
competing values such as freedom of expression and fair trial rights difficult to 
prescribe. Conventional wisdom for the determination of priorities may change from 
place to place and time to time. It is quite possible that the choices that underlie 
today‟s conventional wisdom for determining compromises may themselves be 
overtaken by different circumstances.36 The bias in favour of one constitutional value 
may often change in favour of another competing value as a result of re-appraisal 
and re-evaluation as and when the doctrines are put into practice.37  
This paper argues that in South Africa‟s instance, it has not been a natural or 
gradual progression. Rather it has been an intentional favouring and ranking of 
freedom of expression over other rights. Our judiciary, in assessing the relationship 
                                                                                                                                                                            
one another. Thus there are no absolute rights. And the German Court in harmonising and balancing 
conflicting constitutional rights has created a de facto hierarchy of rights”.   
34
 Meyerson (2004) Acta Juridica 154: “if one compares the pragmatic approach in Jordan’s case to 
the approach of the court in S v Makwanyane it is difficult to avoid the impression that the Bill of 
Rights is being applied selectively. In Makwanyane a principled approach was taken to the death 
penalty and the state was held to the highest standards of justification. In Jordan, by contrast, the 
state carries virtually no burden at all. The justices in Jordan take a legislative or political approach 
rather than a constitutional approach. I suggest that this amounts to a failure to take the Bill of Rights 
seriously”. 
35
 D Bilchitz “Does Balancing Adequately Capture the Nature of Rights?” (2010) 25 Southern African 
Public Law 442. 
36
 M Addo “Freedom of Expression and the Criticism of Judges: A Comparative Study of European 
Legal Standards” (2000) 4-5. 
37
 4-5. 
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between conflicting liberal values, has time and again confirmed the privileged 
nature of freedom of expression.38  
More than a decade into our democracy, it is accepted as a trite doctrine of 
Constitutional law that fundamental rights are capable of limitation. The limitation of 
rights and the way they are conceived has significant effects on what it means to 
have a right. Generally the method used in limiting a right is the “balancing 
approach”.39 The court places the purpose, effects and importance of infringing the 
right on the one side of the scale and the effect of the infringement on the other.40 
Not all infringements of rights are unconstitutional; if it can be justified in accordance 
with s3641 of the Constitution it will be constitutionally valid. A limitation must 
therefore be justifiable, in that it must serve a purpose,42 and linked to that there 
must be good reason for thinking that the restriction will achieve the purpose it is 
designed to achieve, as well as there being no other realistically available way in 
which the purpose can be achieved.43  
The limitation clause does not translate into a standard limitation test, and the 
application and test itself depends on the circumstances, and on a case-by-case 
analysis.44 Therefore the relevant factors45 are not an exhaustive catalogue of what 
must be considered in the limitation enquiry, nor are they checklist of requirements. 
They are simply indicators as to the justifiability of the limitation. Once the court has 
examined each of the factors (none of which were properly considered in Midi) it 
must then weigh up what the factors have revealed about the purpose, effects and 
importance of the infringement on the one hand and the nature and effect of the 
infringement caused on the other.46 
A court must therefore assess the importance of a particular right in the overall 
constitutional scheme. A right that is important to the constitution‟s ambition will carry 
                                                        
38
 10. 
39
 Bilchitz  (2010) Southern African Public Law 423. 
40
 Currie & De Waal (2005) 177. 
41
 S 36(1) “The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom”. “(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other 
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights”. 
42
 Currie & De Waal (2005) 180-181: some important purposes which the CC has considered as 
legitimate in the context of a limitation analysis, is protecting the administration of justice at its 
broadest S v Singo 2002 4 SA 858 (CC); the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of 
crime generally S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo 1996 2 SA 464 (CC) and S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC). 
43
 Currie & De Waal (2005) 164. 
44
 177. 
45
 S 36(1): (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature 
and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; (e) less restrictive 
means. 
46
 Currie & De Waal (2005) 178. 
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a great deal of weight.47 Here it becomes evident, in light of the discussion above in 
the first section, that this is where freedom of expression curries favour. The court is 
also obliged to assess the way in which the limitation affects the right concerned in 
that it must assess whether the limitation is a serious or minor infringement of the 
right. In essence, the law should not use a „sledgehammer to crack a nut”.48 
Therefore, how does the public‟s right to view a documentary intrinsically triumph 
over the right to a fair trial and administration of justice? Was the rejection, and 
stretch to alter a common law rule, of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) 
request to view the tape a sledgehammer in relation to a less restrictive compromise 
of prior viewing (perhaps by an impartial body)? 
In their chapter on “Limitations” Stu Woolman & Henk Botha, in Woolman, Roux, 
Klaaren, Stein, Chaskalson and Bishop 2 ed Constitutional law of South Africa 
(2006) ch 34,49 criticise not only the form of the balancing enquiry undertaken in the 
South African limitations analysis but also the foundational idea that rights can and 
should be balanced.50 Even if the balancing enquiry does not give rights priority over 
competing principles, as is argued, it is capable of giving them unwarranted 
additional weight.51 There are institutional difficulties involved in accurate balancing. 
In certain circumstances, judges might be subjectively predisposed to underestimate 
the strength of certain rights and find ways to justifiably over-protect other rights.52 
In a transformative legal system like ours, there are new types of rules which do 
not simply aim to prescribe individual behaviour; they pursue much more ambitious 
goals, seeking to shape collective conduct and direct individuals and groups toward 
                                                        
47
 178. 
48
 S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) para 34. 
49
 I Currie “Balancing and the Limitation of Rights in the South African Constitution” (2010) 2 South 
African Public Law 25 412-141: balancing has principal defects and the continued deployment in 
limitation analysis of this “bad metaphor” leads limitation jurisprudence seriously astray: (a) 
Incommensurability - the metaphor of “balancing” and its partner “weighing up” suggest that rights and 
the public interest in their limitation are commensurable, measurable by the same metric (b) 
Subjectivity and Arbitrariness - the absence of an objective, external metric for the comparison and 
ordering of competing values creates the danger of subjectivism, that judges will use their own 
personal metric when balancing. 
50
 412. 
51
 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a SabMark International (Freedom 
of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 1 SA 144 (CC) para 48: the protection of trademarks 
must be curtailed to the least intrusive means necessary to achieve its purposes and must be 
restricted to the scope least destructive of and most compatible with free expression. This is not mere 
balancing. The least-destructive means test is meant to put a thumb on the scales on the side of free 
expression.  
52
 Bilchitz (2010) Southern African Public Law 442 431. 
52 
 
social and economic objectives such as affirmative action policies or increasing the 
value of freedom of expression in a society previously devoid of the luxury.53  
What emerges is an instrumental and promotional function of the law, which is 
conceived as fostering social change and implementing public policies.54 This is 
evident in the historical references made in instances of bestowing freedom of 
expression a higher status, as shown above. Because judges are often educated 
under formalistic55 legal doctrines, they may not be well equipped to perform the new 
tasks required as a result of the expansion of their functions.56 When courts cannot 
see a connection with the legal issue to apartheid they are comfortable with the 
traditional vision of the common law, but when they are able to see a connection (as 
in this freedom of expression instance) they invoke new methods which are 
untested.57 This is the case, as this paper argues, in Nugent‟s attempt at balancing in 
the Midi case, where “reconciling” is the method used.  
There are however other ways in which clashing rights may be reconciled.58 All 
the same, if it is accepted that rights may clash, are not absolute and may be limited, 
the question then becomes how do the courts ensure that the choices that are made 
when rights clash with each other are the correct choices?59 As has been shown the 
balancing process involves a selection among, rather than a balancing of, norms and 
the process judges employ entail a moral reading of the constitution that inevitably 
engages their own moral views.60 Balancing is not inherently superior to other legal 
methods. In terms of balancing and judicial behavior, it becomes evident that a lot 
depends on how the tool of balancing is deployed.61  
                                                        
53
 G Carlo & P Pederzoli From Democracy to Juristocracy? The Power of Judges: A Comparative 
Study of Courts and Democracy (2002) 7. 
54
 7. 
55
 D Davis & K Klare “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Common and Customary Law” (2010) 
3 SAJHR 26 407: “occurs when a lawyer believes that a particular authoritative legal norm, concept, 
rule or principle entails a specific legal result or conclusion, when in fact a qualified legal practitioner 
utilising accepted tools and cannons of legal reasoning can generate one or more alternative results 
or conclusions that are also compatible with the norm”. 
56
 Carlo & Pederzoli From Democracy to Juristocracy? 1-7: “there is an increasing trend of judicial 
involvement in a wide range of social, political and economic issues. The social and political 
significance of the judiciary has become a common trait of contemporary democracies. This has 
become known as the “judicialization of politics”.  
57
 Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR 468: There is no literature or case law on the “reconciling” approach 
advocated and used by Nugent JA. 
58
 Banks “Balancing Competing Individual Constitutional Rights: Raising Some Questions” in Law and 
Rights: Global Perspectives on Constitutionalism and Governance (2008) 28: one other example is by 
way of ranking rights in order to resolve conflicts. This approach is adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court, which creates a formal hierarchy of constitutional rights privileging some 
constitutional rights over others, with the First Amendment being an example. 
59
 Du Bois (2004) Acta Juridica 156. 
60
 181. 
61
 Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR 497. 
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As Dennis Davis and Karl Klare accurately put it:  
 
“Balancing suggests the nature of the exercise required, but tells us almost nothing about 
how to conduct it. Merely concluding that a balancing test is appropriate with respect to a 
legal problem leaves us in the dark regarding how to identify, weigh, and prioritise the 
conflicting considerations. For balancing techniques to evolve, let alone for them to 
contribute positively to legal transformation, jurists must begin to establish and disclose 
the scale of values informing their work… To put it simply, they must explain what they 
are doing when they balance and why, and they must begin to discipline the exercise so 
that some consistency in use of the technique may be sought from one case to the next. 
To date, the courts” balancing jurisprudence has been ad hoc, loosely explained, and 
inconsistent. Unless it becomes more disciplined and more deeply rooted in a 
transformative theory of the Constitution, contextual legal reasoning and balancing can 
easily become a new species of formalism”.62 
 
Therefore, the above process has the potential to devalue certain rights when 
consistently inadequate weighing is given to one right over another.63 This leads to 
the situation where rights are overridden where they should not be, as they are not 
accorded the weight they deserve.64 Contrary to the traditional view, the results of 
balancing entail an evident “choice” to prioritise one principle over another,65 and 
given the consistent application by our courts in terms of the justifications for 
freedom of expression, this choice is likely to occur time and time again. Despite the 
terminology or metaphors used to describe the process being used the actual result 
is that, in line with this paper‟s thesis, freedom of expression is being ranked pre-
eminently in the context of contempt law.   
In Midi, the interpretation of the rights involved was scant66 and Nugent in effect 
boiled the limitation analysis down to a copy and pasting of an international trend. 
Nugent seemed to have had his mind made up in favour of freedom of expression 
from the outset.67  Yet, the purpose of hearing the case on appeal was to resolve the 
complex legal issues that were bound to rise again, and which were in need of 
                                                        
62
 497. 
63
 Bilchitz  (2010) Southern African Public Law 428. 
64
 428. 
65
 Currie (2010) South African Public Law 418. 
66
 K Iles “Fresh Look at Limitations: Unpacking Section 36” (2007) 23 SAJHR 68 70. 
67
 Attention was given to the context of freedom of expression in South Africa, but none was given to 
the context of fair trial rights. What about the abhorrent detention laws and lack of fair trial rights 
during apartheid, let alone the extremely high levels of crime in South Africa at present? 
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urgent clarification.68  
This paper submits, in answering the legal question posed, that the reasoning falls 
short of achieving that purpose. On a reflective understanding of the balancing 
process, it becomes evident that consistent preferential treatment of one right over 
another is possible,69 and balancing is not inherently superior to other legal methods. 
Much depends on how the tool of balancing is deployed.70  
Therefore, the conception of freedom of expression discussed above, the 
balancing tendency and inadequacies mentioned coupled with judicial favouritism 
toward freedom of expression answers the “how” question. How a right is perceived 
inevitably has a bearing on how the right is positioned in the legal landscape.71 If our 
judiciary ignores certain aspects of the Constitution and consciously or 
unconsciously prefers certain aspects to others, then the Bill of Rights has not been 
taken seriously. Its authority has been ignored and replaced by the judiciaries‟ own 
views of what the balance of moral and political reasons requires in a particular 
case.72 The point of departure in seeking to define the meaning and scope of this 
right must be the text of the Constitution itself,73 not individual or collective judicial 
preferences and views. In conclusion, it must be emphasized that the right to 
freedom of expression, for all its significance, should not automatically trump other 
rights. Freedom of expressions is becoming a pre-eminent right and its pre-
eminence may be attributed to historical and methodological reasons as well as 
judicial favouritism more generally. Now that we understand the nature of “how” and 
“why” this right is becoming pre-eminent, it is possible to accurately74 re-evaluate a 
restriction or limit, in this instance the sub judice rule, of freedom of expression.  
 
4 Sub judice  
 
                                                        
68
 Midi Television (Pty) Ltd t/a E-TV v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Cape) 2007 2 SACR 
493 (SCA) 
para 4. 
69
 Iles (2007) SAJHR 92. 
70
 Davis & Klare (2010) SAJHR 497. 
71
 Banks “Balancing Competing Individual Constitutional Rights: Raising Some Questions” in Law and 
Rights: Global Perspectives on Constitutionalism and Governance (2008) 142. 
72
 144.  
73
 P Malan & L Dyer “Freedom of Expression and the Statutory Regulation of Political Advertising in 
the Broadcast Media” (2009) 126 SALJ 213 59. 
74
 Taking into account the caution by Kriegler J para 37 in S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) that 
“we should be particularly astute to outlaw any form of thought control, however respectively dressed” 
and the statement by Cameron J in Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) at 860E “that few would 
suggest that South African courts should follow the severe curtailment of the courts” contempt 
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A rule that prevents the prejudicing of pending proceedings requires the courts to 
consider the right of freedom of expression with the right of the litigant to a fair trial.
 
The Midi case dealt with such a rule, the sub judice rule,75 which forms part of the 
broader contempt of court. 76   
Two rationales are advanced with regards to this rule,
 
in that (a) prejudicial 
publicity may impact on the litigants‟ case by influencing the judges or the jury and 
more generally by prejudicing the administration of justice, and (b) the general 
objection to trial by the media.77 Therefore the sub judice rule prohibits comment 
upon judicial proceedings that are under way.78 The effect of this form of contempt is 
to prohibit the publication in the press or other media of any information or 
commentary upon a matter that is sub judice.79 Criminal proceedings are “pending” 
from the moment they have been commenced; that is at arrest, summons or warning 
to appear. From that time the matter is sub judice.  It does not matter that the actual 
trial has not started.80 
Historical scepticism81 (as mentioned above) has put the focus of judiciaries‟ 
attention solely on the ulterior motives for which such restrictions on freedom of 
expression have been used.82 The essential reasoning behind such restrictions is to 
protect the administration of justice and the dignity of the personalities involved 
therein.83 The historical elitist and royal antecedent arguments against the contempt 
institution have been over-emphasised, and the arguments that are socially and 
democratically more acceptable in an age that plays allegiance to the dictates of 
reason and liberty are favoured. 84 This is evident by the democratic and 
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fundamental emphasis of the need to entrench and over-value freedom of 
expression as mentioned earlier.  
In conclusion therefore, even if the jury
 
and judge distinction holds true in an 
argument against this rule,85 it is readily conceivable that publicity concerning the 
identity of the accused, where identity is an issue, or details concerning witnesses, 
who might then be intimidated,86 may undermine the administration of justice.87 
Therefore this paper submits that there are still relevant circumstances in which the 
administration of justice and the right to a fair trial could be interfered with, which 
justifies the retention of the rule.88 But, as will be shown below, the decision of the 
SCA has radically altered our contempt of court law, and effectively obliterated the 
rule. Prior to Midi, publishing interviews with witnesses before their testimony in court 
constituted a classic instance of a breach of the sub judice rule.89 Part of the reason 
for the discussion above and the discussion of the restriction here, is that it will help 
with a critical reconsideration of Midi. As will become evident given the quiet 
revolution of freedom of expression, the sub judice rule stood no chance when it 
came up against the right to freedom of expression. 
 
5 Midi  
 
In Midi the respondent, the DPP of the Western Cape, sought an application in the 
Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division to interdict the appellants (the above 
broadcaster trading as “e-TV”) from broadcasting material on 3rd Degree relating to a 
high profile case, the Baby Jordan murder, still under investigation. State witnessess‟ 
interviews were to be broadcast in the television programme. The DPP argued it 
might prejudice the states case, the investigation, hinder the accused right to fair 
trial, and hinder or obstruct effective prosecution. e-TV relied on s16 of the 
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Constitution stating that it amounted to pre-publication censorship, it had a right to 
broadcast and the public had a right to see it. The applicants argued a clear right and 
interference with that right had to be established for the interdict to be successful. 
The respondent sought an opportunity to view the documentary so they could satisfy 
themselves that the broadcast would not prejudice the upcoming trial.90   
The DPP won in the High Court,91 presided over by Zondi AJ, and e-TV took the 
decision on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (the SCA).92  
The documentary had been broadcast by the time the appeal was heard in the 
SCA and the case was still heard because it raised important questions of law on 
which there was little authority and would likely come before the courts again.93  
In dealing with this question of law, Nugent formulates the limitation analysis 
particular to such an issue.94 However, he adds, this case is a special one, which 
seeks to evaluate mutually limiting rights95 and to this end a court must “reconcile”96 
them to accommodate each other.97 In this vein he states that they cannot be 
reconciled by purporting to weigh the value of one right against the value of the other 
and then preferring the right that is considered to be more valued, and jettisoning the 
other, because “all protected rights have equal value”. Rather the reconciliation 
should only limit the one right to the extent it is still able to accommodate the other, 
or by an appropriate limitation of both rights. All of which is to be done according to 
what is required by the particular circumstances and within the constraints that are 
imposed by s36.98  
In deciding what is to be weighed in such an analysis, Nugent points out that it is 
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the benefit that flows from allowing the intrusion that is to be weighed against the 
loss that the intrusion will entail. It is only if the particular loss is outweighed by the 
particular benefit, to an extent that meets the standard that is set by s36, that the law 
will recognise the validity of the intrusion.99 Nugent then gives brief accounts of the 
rights100 in contention, and the extent and instances where administration of justice 
prevails over freedom of expression.101 He states again that neither of the rights is 
absolute. This is apparently what distinguishes us from the United States.102 
Despite this, Nugent says the comparative jurisdictions such as Australia, England 
and Canada (which also don‟t give pre-dominance to Freedom of Expression) 
nonetheless require a stricter test in curtailing the freedom, and our old cases that 
say otherwise103 are not in keeping with these developments.104  
Therefore he concludes and states the new reformulated test as:  
 
“a publication will be unlawful, and thus susceptible to being prohibited, only if the 
prejudice that the publication might cause to the administration of justice is demonstrable 
and substantial and there is a real risk that the prejudice will occur if publication takes 
place. Mere conjecture or speculation that prejudice might occur will not be enough. Even 
then publication will not be unlawful unless a court is satisfied that the disadvantage of 
curtailing the free flow of information outweighs its advantage. In making that evaluation it 
is not only the interests of those who are associated with the publication that need to be 
brought to account but, more important, the interests of every person in having access to 
information”.105 
 
Therefore the new test states, that “without a reasonable apprehension that the 
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conduct of the trial would indeed be compromised by the broadcast of the 
documentary, that in itself provided no grounds for prohibiting the broadcast”.106 He 
states that one cannot speculate what the documentary might or might not 
contain.107 Nugent concedes that the DPP “did not know what the documentary 
contained and so he could not say that the administration of justice would be 
prejudiced if it was broadcast”.108 How is one to know what something entails without 
knowing what it entails? Despite this, Nugent is of the view that untrustworthy or 
inconsistent witnesses would help the States case either way.109 
In light of the above, this paper agrees with the view expressed by Zondi AJ.110 
Even if what the DPP was seeking was a peek before broadcasting, this paper does 
not think that a peek has the effect of banning the publication, in the interests of the 
public at large allowing the DPP to do so would have been the more reasonable. All 
that the DPP seeks is to have access to the broadcast material in order to satisfy 
itself that its right to a fair trial is protected. The limitation on e-TV‟s right to freedom 
of expression is in the circumstances reasonable.111 
However, the legal issue as Nugent saw it was whether any law obliged e-TV to 
furnish a copy of the documentary to the DPP before it was broadcast, and not 
whether it was reasonable to require e-TV to do so.112 It is here that Nugent 
contradicts himself - “I have already pointed out that the law prohibits e-TV from 
broadcasting material that prejudices the administration of justice”. Yet in the next 
sentence he states that there is no such law to this effect113 - “in the absence of a 
valid law that restricts that freedom a court is not entitled to impose a restriction of its 
own”.114 Was he not dealing with such a law? Council for the DPP exhausted other 
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avenues,115 and asked what it could have done or must do in future to ensure a 
publication will not prejudice a trial. The answer it seems is that one can only hope 
that a publication will not impede the administration of justice.116 The appeal was 
upheld and the High Court order was set aside.117  
This is a judgement that does a lot, very briefly and unconvincingly. In assessing 
the case, it becomes evident that the new test as reformulated is impossible to meet 
(a clear extension of S v Mamabolo 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC)).118 The threshold is set 
too high and the sub judice rule has effectively been destroyed. This judgement has 
dramatically widened the scope of the constitutional right to freedom of 
expression.119 It not only endorses the presumption against prior restraints, but it 
also has effectively disbarred the courts from interdicting defamatory publications.120 
“The sub judice rule is vital to the proper administration of justice and the fair trial 
rights of the accused, and helps to ensure that evidence considered by the court is 
not tainted”.121  
The constitutional validity of the sub judice rule in South Africa has narrowly been 
evaluated on two grounds (a) that it encroaches on freedom of expression, which 
must receive greater protection than the due administration of justice, and (b) 
because judges do not need the rule to arrive at objective and impartial decisions.122  
A result of the case is that the courts should from now adopt the principle of 
“publish and be damned”, rather than order that the article be interdicted. A party 
cannot rely on speculative harm to justify censoring the press, and further, even if 
the high threshold has been met the court still has discretion in the matter in that the 
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ban has to be necessary and proportionate to prevent the prejudice from occurring. 
Therefore according to Dario Milo & Pamela Stein, “in one polite sentence, the court 
impliedly, in our view, discards the existing sub judice test”.123 This new test is 
structured so that even interviewing witnesses in a murder trial before they give 
evidence may not justify a publication ban. „so although the Midi-TV case has 
entered our law books under the radar, it has affected a quiet revolution for freedom 
of the press”.124 
To others, in line with the conception and trend toward revering freedom of 
expression, the judgement is a “victory for the protection of press and media 
freedom, which will stem the descent into legal censorship”.125 “It is to be welcomed 
as a victory for press freedom, the entrenchment of constitutional principles and the 
promotion of an open and accountable democracy”.126 The case is welcomed as a 
landmark victory for constitutionalism, the protection of freedom of expression and 
the subsequent entrenchment of democratic principles.127 It has been described as 
“an excellent and redeeming judgement, reflecting jurisprudence that is libertarian 
par excellence in character”.128  
They would argue that the potential for misuse of the rule outweighs the possibility 
of a risk to administration of justice. This approach however is extreme and one that 
fails to give value to the right to a fair trial.129 It is evident that these sentiments flow 
from historical circumstances and the historical scepticism as stated earlier, linking 
the rights pre-eminence to the fact that high profile criminal trials under the apartheid 
regime were often deliberately held in remote areas so that proceedings were 
practically immune from scrutiny.130 Evidently times have changed and this could not 
be further from the truth in Oscar Pretorius‟s instance. 
Rights are not absolute;131 they may be infringed, but only if the infringement is for 
compelling reasons.132 Pre-trial publicity is such a reason and it need not be a 
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monster to be avoided at all costs. The sub judice rule can be accepted as a 
necessary constitutional safeguard and not as a form of state censorship or an 
erosion of the press.133 However, given the way freedom of expression has been 
interpreted and balanced in such instances, the rule under consideration has 
evidently been viewed in this negative light, and freedom of expression has in effect 
obliterated the sub judice rule.   
 
6 Conclusion 
 
It is possible to justify legitimate free-speech restrictions in the legal domain in 
cases where popular hysteria and pressure tend to invade the judicial and legal 
process, as seen in the Oscar Pistorius instance.134 The unrestricted publication of 
all facts relating to the administration of justice can in certain cases thwart the 
interests of justice. This cannot be denied and therefore some restrictions should be 
permissible.135 There are many important considerations that are given less weight 
when freedom of expression is put on the scale such as the life of the accused, the 
safety of the community, the detection of crime and the attempt to safeguard the 
truthfulness of testimony in court.136 The protection of witnesses and difficulties in 
procuring witnesses is an important factor as well. While freedom of expression is an 
important element of a free society, equal importance should be given to the right to 
a fair trial and the functioning of an effective justice system for the protection of vital 
societal interests.137  
This paper submits that no democratic society can burden its citizens with an 
unqualified affirmation to privilege freedom of expression unreservedly, even within 
contempt law.138 However strong one‟s adherence to freedom of expression may be, 
there are vital values of another and not necessarily inferior kind to which ones 
advocacy for freedom of expression must be tempered.139 While it may be true that 
freedom of expression in the past has been short-changed, nonetheless its‟ belated 
claim for full recognition cannot be interpreted as an absolute and limitless one.140  
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Both the judiciary and the media should aspire to earning the trust of the public 
and of one another,141 instead of playing a game of “cat and mouse”.142 Cooperation 
between the media and the judicial system will strengthen and, it is hoped, justify the 
public‟s confidence in both institutions.143 The judgement of Zondi AJ shows a 
pragmatic approach that is to be preferred to such a problem.144 This dialogic 
approach was not even considered by the SCA in Midi because the bench was bent 
on affording freedom of expression it‟s deserved pre-eminence. 
Therefore, this paper submits that the time is ripe: 
 
“For the media, the Prosecuting Authority, Bar associations, the judiciary and other 
stakeholders to devise South African guidelines in order to sensitise the Bar, Bench, 
press and the police to the issues involved, and to function in our constitutional state 
without encroaching on the limits of the other‟s domain and rights. Pre-trial publicity might 
then become a friendly monster and the sub judice rule would be accepted as a 
necessary constitutional safeguard and not as a form of state censorship or an erosion of 
the freedom of the press”.145  
 
However, for now the tension between the players in the field remains. Despite 
the often-stated assertions that all rights are equal, this is clearly not the case in the 
law of contempt. Whatever impact the media may have on the criminal trial in 
general, and in relation to Oscar Pistorius, will remain ignored. Freedom of 
expression spoke and it is a given that no such adverse influence exists. Media‟s 
impact on the law, which will only increase, will remain an anomaly. The scale has 
been tilted and Midi has entered the law books under the radar affecting a not so 
quiet revolution for freedom of the press. 
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